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The “Great Recession” of 2008 was the greatest global 
financial crisis since the Great Depression. It led to the 
bankrupting of businesses, caused credit markets to dry 
up, imploded the housing market, and led to a near 
collapse of global trade. The plunge in trade that occurred 
between the second quarter of 2008 and the third quarter 
of 2009 was the steepest fall of world trade in recorded 
history.1  
Nowhere was this drop in 
trade more pronounced than 
in the United States, where 
the trade-to-GDP ratio fell by 
a larger percentage than in 
any previous recession, in-
cluding the Great Depres-
sion.2 As Figure 1 shows, 
during the Great Recession, 
the U.S. trade-to-GDP ratio 
declined by more than twen-
ty percent in a single year.  
In response to the Great De-
pression, the U.S. passed the 
U.S. Tariff Act of 1930. As a 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Free trade agreements, and 
membership in the WTO, kept 
the U.S. from engaging in 
protectionism after the Great 
Recession. 
  
The proposed Trans-Pacific 
Partnership would be the 
largest trade agreement since 
the NAFTA, accounting for 
nearly 40% of all global trade. 
 
By embracing the global 
economy through initiatives like 
NAFTA and the TPP, the U.S. 
can foster increased job growth 
and economic prosperity for its 
own citizens, and for individuals 
around the globe.   
2 
result, nearly 900 American import duties 
were increased, limiting Americans’ access 
to cheaper foreign goods and triggering re-
taliation from our trading partners. For this 
reason, the Act has been blamed as a con-
tributing factor in extending the length and 
severity of the Great Depression. Thankfully, 
policymakers in the U.S. followed a different 
course of action following the Great Reces-
sion than they did in the aftermath of  the 
Great Depression. Why was this? 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
Institutional explanations for the lack of 
large-scale protectionism have largely cen-
tered on the role that the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) plays in governing inter-
national trade. The WTO, established in 
1995 and made up of 159 countries, works 
to increase global trade, acting as an avenue 
where nations can negotiate trade agree-
ments and settle trade disputes with one 
another.3  
As a significant member in this organization, 
the United States was greatly inhibited from 
engaging in protectionism as a response to 
the Great Recession. This can be attributed 
to the discipline imposed by WTO rules, 
which are particularly binding for developed 
nations and serve to constrain the ability of 
governments to increase protectionism. 
When WTO nations agree to open their mar-
kets to one another, they “bind” themselves 
together by instituting ceilings on customs 
tariff rates. Developing countries often tax 
imports at rates lower than the “bound” 
agreement to increase their nation’s access 
to cheap foreign products. However, in de-
veloped nations, like the United States, the 
actual tariff rates nearly always match the 
“bound” rates. After these “bound” rates 
have been set, a nation can only change its 
rates through costly renegotiations with its 
trading partners, likely requiring some form 
of compensation to engender agreement on 
new terms.4 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
In addition to WTO restrictions, economic 
incentives, such as international capital 
flows for cheap labor and products, can 
wield a strong influence in constraining pro-
tectionism. The flow of international capital 
leads to offices and factories being situated 
around the world, thus entangling the econ-
omies. This global footprint provides a 
strong disincentive to protectionism, partic-
ularly if those facilities are part of the global 
supply chain that buys and sells across bor-
ders. To remain the least-cost producer at 
any stage in the supply chain means keeping 
protectionism at bay by remaining engaged 
in global trade.5 Protectionism through tar-
iffs would increase the costs of inputs in a 
producing country and make that nation’s 
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Source: World Bank. (2014). Merchandise trade (% of GDP). Data retrieved 
April 16, 2014, from World DataBank: World Development Indicators data-
base.  
Figure 1: U.S. Trade as a Percentage of 
GDP 
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producers less competitive globally.  
 
Trade across the global market essentially 
creates a zero-sum game, whereby the de-
mand for cheap inputs by domestic firms 
around the globe exerts countervailing pres-
sure against protectionism. Simply put, do-
mestic and international businesses and 
consumers have come to rely on the cheap 
products made available through interna-
tional trade. As long as the U.S. economy 
continues to rely upon and benefit from free 
trade, protectionist responses to economic 
crises will not only be impractical, but harm-
ful as well. Recognizing this fact, the U.S. 
continues to push for closer integration in 
international trade by pursuing free trade 
agreements with other nations. 
 
PURSUING FURTHER INTEGRATION 
The United States is currently working on a 
far-reaching trade agreement with twelve 
other nations, the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP). The TPP is a proposed free trade 
agreement between the United States, Cana-
da, Mexico, Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and 
Japan. South Korea may soon become in-
volved in the Partnership as well. Together, 
TPP countries make up roughly 40 percent 
of the world’s GDP and 26 percent of total 
global trade.8 In an attempt to move away 
from what some have seen as a preoccupa-
tion with the Middle East, the Obama admin-
istration has stated a desire to pivot its geo-
political priorities toward Asia. The TPP 
would form the economic centerpiece of this 
strategy, with many of the Partnership’s 
provisions seemingly constructed to exclude 
China specifically.  
The TPP has been likened to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
enacted in 1994 between the U.S., Canada, 
and Mexico. Some make the comparison to 
NAFTA derisively, accusing the NAFTA of 
harmful effects such as facilitating the elimi-
nation of U.S. jobs. However, according to 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, nearly 5 mil-
lion U.S. jobs exist as a direct result of the 
increased trade with Canada and Mexico 
created through NAFTA.6 The NAFTA now 
constitutes the world’s largest free trade 
area, linking 450 million people producing 
$17 trillion worth of goods and services an-
nually.7  
While the Obama administration seeks sup-
port for the TPP within Congress, some poli-
cymakers in the U.S. have continued to em-
brace a form of neo-protectionism, seeming-
ly afraid of what they perceive to be nega-
tive consequences of the Partnership. These 
opponents believe that the TPP will harm 
American workers by causing jobs to be off-
shored to countries with lower environmen-
tal standards or labor costs. This argument 
may have some merit; however, the net ben-
efits of the Partnership would far outweigh 
the negatives. According to the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative, roughly 
four million U.S. jobs are already supported 
In addition to WTO 
restrictions… international 
capital flows for cheap 
labor and products can 
wield a strong influence in 
constraining protectionism.  
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through trade of goods and services with 
TPP countries. Implementation of the TPP 
would generate an additional $77 billion in 
real income benefits for the U.S. as a whole.9 
Unfortunately, politically powerful sub-
groups, like labor unions and consumer or 
environmental protection advocates, contin-
ue to work toward stalling a trade agree-
ment that would benefit the vast majority of 
United States citizens.  
Free trade in general, and the TPP in partic-
ular, can provide many net benefits by in-
creasing access to cheaper products for both 
businesses and individuals alike. The new 
global economy, powered by the prolifera-
tion of global supply chains, increased trade 
agreements, decreased trade barriers, and 
an increased number of foreign-based facili-
ties, works as a powerful disincentive to 
protectionism. By rejecting protectionism, 
and further embracing this new economy 
through initiatives like the TPP, the U.S. has 
the opportunity to increase job growth and 
economic prosperity for individuals both 
domestically, and abroad. 
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